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With the election on 26 March of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin as president of Russia, it 
was natural to speculate about whom he would bring into his administration and what 
policies he may pursue. Fortunately, two recently published articles identify 26 
individuals, already in government or soon to be occupying responsible positions, as 
Putin appointees (see table below). Almost half of them have been identified as former 
or current KGB/FSB intelligence officers. The percentage may be even higher, because 
only sparse data are available on the backgrounds of other recent appointees.
This situation seems natural enough, if one expects Putin to bring into his own 
presidential administration "the best and the brightest" (as he calls his former KGB/FSB 
colleagues), who will implement his policies. Since organized crime controls some 40 
percent of GDP, according to the new president,(2) one would look for him to curtail 
such activities on a priority basis.
Assignment of current and/or former intelligence officers to key governmental positions 
suggests that Russia is on its way to becoming an authoritarian state, as it had been 
from Lenin through Khrushchev. Already, the FSB (domestic intelligence agency) has 
been ordered to monitor the allegiance of military personnel, i.e., becoming a police 
force in the armed services. At the same time, military training of schoolboys from age 
15 was instituted on 31 December 1999, the day that Putin became acting president.(3)
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Early in the subsequent month, Putin approved a law providing security agencies with 
access to all e-mail in Russia as well as other electronic traffic carried on the Internet. 
"This means Russia has become a police state," said Yelena Bonner, widow of the late 
nuclear physicist and Soviet-era dissident Andrei Sakharov.(4) Moreover, Putin himself 
has never condemned either the role played by the secret police or the mass 
deportations of the Chechen people by Stalin. On the contrary, as acting president, he 
explained his actions as follows:
"The people want order to be introduced in Russia. And we are acting in the North 
Caucasus. I can firmly say we are doing this on the instruction of the Russian 
people."(5)
According to an eyewitness report from Moscow, soon after assuming the premiership, 
Putin invited his four immediate predecessors (Yevgeny Primakov, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
Sergei Kirienko, and Sergei Stepashin) to provide him with advice regarding Chechnya. 
They all counseled caution in early September 1999, suggesting occupation only of the 
flat northern one-third of the territory. From such a vantage point, commando raids could 
be launched against rebel leaders. This advice was not heeded. Russia attempted to 
take control of mountainous areas, which Stepashin doubts Russia will be able to 
secure.(6)
In the meanwhile, the capital city of Grozny has been leveled and its 400,000 
inhabitants dispersed. Some 300,000 refugees have fled abroad, at least 10,000 
Chechens have been killed, and yet the fighting continues. Some of the atrocities have 
been filmed and even aired on television in Moscow. Is this what the Russian people 
really want?
The pro-government Russian Public Television (ORT) recently showed the bombing of a 
large Chechen village by TOS-1 rockets, filled with flammable liquid, and Tochka-U 
missiles that cover up to seven hectares of land with cluster shrapnel actions in clear 
2
violation of the 1980 Geneva Convention.(7) Since the order to do so has been 
approved by Putin, he should be tried as a war criminal.
The Russian "people," we are told, want law and order. There has been little discussion 
as to how this will be effected under the Putin presidency. He also vows to eliminate 
corruption. However, allegations and rumors hinting at Putin's involvement in 
questionable business and governmental activities during the past decade have 
surfaced time and again. Should these allegations prove to be true, they cast a different 
light on the man who has attempted to project himself as a crime fighter who will 
eliminate corruption in high places. Crime and corruption among government officials 
increased by 35.6 percent during 1999, according to First Deputy Interior Minister 
Vladimir Kozlov. The total number of cases reached 53,700, although only 21,000 
officials were charged.(8)
On the other hand, the new national security concept, signed by acting President Putin 
on 6 January 2000, holds greater significance for the United States and the international 
community as a whole. It should be noted that he had been responsible for producing 
this document as Yel'tsin's national security advisor.
Most significant in this concept is the reversal from an earlier "no first-use" pledge 
regarding nuclear weapons. Basic external threats to Russia, according to the 
document, include:
• attempts to weaken the political, economic, and military influence of Russia in the 
world;
• the strengthening of politico-military blocs, especially through NATO expansion 
eastward;
• the possibility that foreign military blocs will appear within the immediate proximity 
of Russian borders;
• proliferation of mass-destruction weapons and delivery systems;
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• intensification of centrifugal processes within the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS);
• penetration and escalation of conflicts near Russian and CIS borders;
• territorial demands against Russia.(9)
The same section states that the foregoing may also affect Russia's national interests in 
Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Asian-Pacific region, 
i.e., most of the world outside of Africa and the Western Hemisphere.
It should be noted that the new national security concept supersedes the one issued as 
a decree by then President Boris N. Yel'tsin on 17 December 1997. No public discussion 
ever took place on the draft versions of either document. Parliament also had been 
ignored both times. The current concept is described as being a political document 
based upon government policy regarding "defense of the country from external and 
internal threats."
These threats include foreign intelligence organizations which allegedly have activated 
their clandestine special services on Russian territory. Attempts at interference also 
emanate from other government levels. Direct threats include separatism and local 
armed conflict. Information warfare is supposedly being intensified by unfriendly 
regimes through attempts to remove Russia from both external and internal information 
marketplaces.
Guaranteeing Russia's national security involves the following tasks:
• maintenance of territorial integrity and security of borders; 
• support at adequate levels of military potential;
• tightening non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons;
• introduction of effective measures to frustrate subversive activities by foreign 
intelligence agencies.
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Such an atmosphere suggests an attempt to create a "Fortress Russia" mentality, so 
that the population will support all measures by the new government in Moscow, 
regardless of their impact on the average citizen.
In its conclusion, the new national security concept envisages the stationing of Russian 
troops in "certain strategically important regions of the world." Such "limited military 
contingents" (the 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan during 197989 as well as the 
combat brigade with nuclear weapons in Cuba during 26 October25 December 1962 
both shared that designation) would be located at overseas military bases, which could 
guarantee reaction to crisis situations in their initial stages.
By replacing the former designation "partnership" with the word "cooperation" with the 
West, the tone of this new and more neutral term suggests a revised official attitude in 
Moscow. The latest security concept, thus, emphasizes Russia's nuclear power. This 
makes it imperative for the United States to consider the real danger of tactical nuclear 
weapons being used by Moscow. The possibility of their application during a future local 
war, or even the one in Chechnya today, becomes greater as Russia's conventional 
armed forces deteriorate.
Addressing a session of the Security Council in Moscow on 23 November 1999, then 
Prime Minister Putin stated that additional funds would be provided for deployment in 
the Mediterranean of Russia's sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, one 
destroyer, a frigate, one tanker, and nuclear-powered submarines carrying SLBMs by 
November 2000. The Tartus base in Syria, first used for Russia's Mediterranean 
squadron in 1983, will be reactivated. Improvements at the Cam Ranh Bay naval 
installation for Russia's 15th Operational Squadron are also planned, based on the 1979 
agreement with Vietnam which expires in 2004.(10)
Two months later, then acting President Putin announced at a meeting of his cabinet 
that funds for the government's acquisition of new weapons systems (goszakaz) would 
be increased by 150 percent compared with calendar year 1999. He also stated that the 
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military-industrial complex had produced 30 percent more high-technology arms during 
that timeframe than in 1998, all of world-class quality.(11)
At the same meeting of his cabinet ministers on 27 January 2000, Putin announced that 
defense spending would be 50 percent higher than during 1999. There also will be a 
change in priorities from the policy in recent years of allocating 80 percent of all funds to 
strategic missile forces. This will drop to 30 percent, with the rest to be spent for 
conventional weapons systems.(12)
The foregoing are obviously future intentions and should not be confused with 
capabilities. However, the West in general and the United States in particular have been 
placed on notice that Russia under its new president intends to become a rival in due 
course and not a partner.
Putin's Cadres in St. Petersburg and Moscow
Name! ! ! Position!  ! ! ! Connection
Abramov, Aleksandr!Deputy Director, ! ! ! ex-VP, Al'fa Bank
! ! ! Presidential Administration 
! ! ! (relations with regions)!
Alekseev, Sergei! Director, largest exhibit hall ! acquaintance from St. Petersburg
! ! ! (LenExpo) in St. Petersburg!  
Bobrovsky, Nikolai! Deputy Director, Prime ! ! co-student at KGB Institute
! ! ! Minister's secretariat!
Bolloev, Taimuraz! Director General, Baltika ! ! sports connection
! ! ! Beer Co.!
Chemezov, Sergei! Head, PromEksport! ! ! ex-KGB officer
Cherkesov, Viktor! First Deputy Director, FSB! ! co-student at law school
Golov, Sergei! ! Deputy Director, Presidential ! ex-KGB officer
! ! ! Administration!
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Golubev, Valeri! Head, Tourism Commission, ! ex-KGB officer
! ! ! St. Petersburg!  
Gref, German! First Deputy Minister, ! ! head, Center for Strategic
! ! ! Government Property Office! Studies
Ivanov, Sergei! Secretary, Security Council! ex-KGB officer and close friend
Ivanov, Viktor! ! Deputy Director, Presidential ! ex-KGB/FSB
! ! ! Administration!
Khrameshkin, ! Director, "Leningrad" Import-! acquaintance from St. Petersburg
! Nikolai! Export --Industry Association!
Kozak, Dmitri! Putin's Deputy Chief of Staff! worked with VVP in St. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Petersburg
Kozhin, Vladimir! Head, Foreign Exchange Export ! ex-KGB officer
! ! ! Control (FSB)!  
Kudrin, Aleksei! First Deputy Finance Minister! knew VVP in St. Petersburg
Medvedev, Dmitri! Deputy Director, Presidential ! law degree, St. Petersburg
! ! ! Administration!
Miller, Aleksei! Director, Baltic Pipeline Co.! former VVP deputy, St. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Petersburg
Patrushev, Nikolai! Director, FSB! ! ! (succeeded VVP) in Leningrad 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! KGB
Reiman, Leonid! Communications Minister!  ! friend and traveling companion
Sechin, Igor'!  ! Deputy Director, Presidential ! headed VVP Secretariat,
! ! ! Administration!   ! ! when PM
Shamakhov, !! Director, NW Administration,! friend and ex-KGB officer
! Vladimir! State Customs (FSB)
Shevchenko, Yuri! Health Minister and M.D! ! old acquaintance
Spassky, Boris! Academician; Director, Defense ! acquaintance from St. Petersburg
! ! ! Research Institute!
Stepanov, Andrei! Director, Oil Co., St. Petersburg! worked with VVP in St. 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Petersburg
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Yakovlev, Vladimir! Chairman, Culture Commission, ! close friend
! ! ! St. Petersburg!
Zaostrovsky, Yuri! Deputy Director, FSB !  ! ex-KGB officer 
Sources: 
Dmitri Ezhov, "Dos'e: Blizhnii krug," Sobesednik, no. 1 (806), 1319 January 2000, p. 3; 
Igor' Cherniak, "Liudi Putina: kto est' kto," Komosomsol'skaya pravda, no. 14 (23238), 
26 January 2000, p. 6.
Note: 
The author expresses his gratitude to Ms. Molly Molloy, Slavic research librarian at the 
Hoover Institution, for her kind assistance in compiling this table as well as for other 
invaluable help.
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